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Abstract — Crossroads of international issues, maritime 
domain is facing growing human activities (fishing, 
transportation, boating…) involving a large spectrum of ships 
from small sailing boats to super tankers. This increase of 
maritime mobilities has favored the appearance and 
generalization of position report systems for keeping track of 
ships movements. Amongst these systems, cooperative position 
reports using devices such as the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) have been widely deployed and used. Recent works have 
shown that falsification of AIS messages is possible, and therefore 
could mask or favor illegal actions, lead to disturbance of 
monitoring systems and new maritime risks. This paper presents 
these new threats and risks and introduces a novel 
methodological approach for modelling, analyzing and detecting 
such maritime events. 
Keywords—Automatic Identification System (AIS), maritime 
risks, data mining 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The maritime environment has a huge impact on the world 
economy and our everyday lives. Beyond being a space where 
numerous marine species live, the sea is also a place where 
human activities (sailing, cruising, fishing, goods 
transportation...) evolve and increase drastically [2]. This ever 
increasing traffic leads to navigation difficulties and risks in 
coastal and crowded areas where numerous ships exhibit 
different movement objectives which can be conflicting (e.g. 
sailing vs. fishing). The disasters and damages caused in the 
event of sea collisions can pose serious threats to the 
environment and human lives. The sea surveillance has 
therefore become a major concern. Many government 
authorities have set up strategies to prevent these sea tragedies 
but also to protect the principle of free movement, control of 
people's rights and territorial integrity. These last objectives 
imply a need to “provide an answer” to illegal immigration, 
drug smuggling, and terrorism.  
From this dynamic emerges the will to develop sea 
surveillance systems including ways to improve maritime 
security and identify illegal or suspicious ships behaviors. The 
consideration of this control issue by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has partly evolved in the last 
decade from education and navigational rules (e.g. 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea: 
COLREGS) to technical answers for traffic monitoring. The 
IMO has thereby defined the e-navigation concept, based on 
the harmonization of marine navigation systems with the 
collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of 
maritime information onboard and ashore by electronic means 
[3]. 
The understanding of a maritime situation and/or vessels 
intentions comes through an analysis of ships localizations. 
Such an analysis can rely on short and/or long-term data 
records. Short-term is related to the identification of 
instantaneous comportment (for example an intrusion in a 
restricted area) and long-term is related to the analysis of 
trajectories with the identification of specific behaviors (for 
example having forbidden or dangerous manoeuvres). 
Nowadays, ships are fitted out with almost real-time position 
report systems whose objective is to identify and locate 
vessels at distance (Automatic Identification System (AIS) for 
example).  The AIS completes the radar pictures in order to 
provide a declarative and a real-time situation to ships. It 
provides data to land services such as harbour authorities and 
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in charge of traffic surveillance 
but they also feed on-line providers (e.g. Marine Traffic) with 
high frequency position reports. Combined with radar 
surveillance and others, real-time localization of ships in 
coastal area (around 40 miles) is effective though given the 
wider range of AIS (as compared with radar), the maritime 
situation beyond radar range solely depends on AIS messages 
received. Also, there exist some recent VTS centers that 
depend totally on AIS technology when they are not equipped 
with radar.  
This research belongs to a French National Research 
Agency (ANR) project which started in November 2014.  The 
following presents new threats and risks raised by falsification 
and hacking of the AIS and introduces our methodological 
approach for modelling, analyzing and detecting these new 
maritime risks. Section II describes possible failures of the 
AIS at the physical, communication, logical levels and 
proposes a classification of related risks and threats raised by 
attacks. Section III sketches risk modeling principles and 
introduces real-time message-based data mining methodology 
proposed to identify abnormal messages and navigational 
behaviors. Section IV gives some conclusions and current 
perspectives. 
II. RISKS AND THREATS 
There are several definitions of risk, which usually give a 
dual meaning to this concept. The risk includes both the 
potential losses (vulnerability) and the probability of a 
hazardous event [18]. 
In order to improve the management of these risks at sea, 
the maritime surveillance system must reach an improved 
analysis of the behaviors of ships, along with an integrated 
surveillance system. Much research is still ongoing in the field 
of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), which is defined as 
the constant perception of maritime environmental elements 
with respect to time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning and the projection of their status after some variable 
has changed [19]. Thus new axes for reflection should be 
addressed, in order to improve the process of risk detection.  
The International Maritime Organization has defined the 
MDA as the understanding of all information and activities 
associated with the marine environment, which may have an 
impact on security, safety, economy or environment [9]. 
However, the spoofing of the AIS system (onboard or not) 
leads to new risks at sea. Those risks are about the vessel 
itself, the surrounding vessels, the environment, offshore and 
coastal infrastructures, organizations and finally societies. 
This underlines the urgent need for the development of large-
scale monitoring systems managing the problem beyond MDA 
principles through the understanding of maritime situation but 
also through the understanding of technical means providing 
this maritime situation. 
A. Vulnerabilities of the AIS system at sea, at 
radiocommunication level and ashore 
1) A lack of control of AIS installations 
The installation of AIS transponders on ships, their initial 
configuration and the permanent information (such as MMSI, 
name, length, position on the ship, etc.) embedded in the 
transponders are made by certified installers in order to 
provide a standardized exploitation such as described by IMO 
(IMO Res.917(22) and IMO Res.956(23, 2004)). 
Nonetheless, the data send by transponders, onboard ships 
or ashore, are not subject to any kind of control. The IMO 
recalls users and installers that it is their responsibility to make 
sure that data sent are exact and conform to existing standards, 
but a shutdown, a bad or a lack of declaration regarding the 
current status of the ship (specifically voyage related data), a 
wrong installation (position, power, connection to sensors) or 
a wrong configuration of the transponder (frequency, type of 
messages sent) may have an impact on the mutual detection of 
ships resulting in absence of detection or low detection rate, 
bad handling of the risk of collision, false alarms and also 
have an impact on the detection of abnormal behaviour by 
maritime surveillance systems. 
2) Vulnerabilities of embedded AIS transponders 
It is clearly stated in IMO Res. 917(22) that only static 
information was supposed to be saved in the transponder when 
it is installed and connected onboard. Nonetheless, it is still 
possible to modify them afterwards through simple means and 
these pieces of information might be made irrelevant if not 
correctly updated when some changes in the life of the vessel 
occur (change of name, change of position of the transponder). 
Other data such as voyage related or dynamic information 
are not controlled by any means though it is strongly 
recommended that users should check their correctness and 
check the right configuration and installation of the 
transponder on a regular basis. It is a common case that ships 
travelling from one departure point to another have voyage 
related information that is not updated. 
Regarding the use of AIS onboard ships, IMO warns the 
users and recalls that AIS is a complementary resource of 
localization of neighbouring ships after the primary resource 
which is the radar. Nonetheless, given that the radar range is 
often shorter than AIS range and that the radar is far more 
sensitive to environmental perturbations (atmospheric 
conditions, sea state, size and distance from other ships), the 
AIS is often the only way to identify and localize ships or 
AtoNs in the far. A ship may currently modify its trajectory 
(heading, speed, rate of turn) based on AIS data that cannot be 
confirmed by other sources of information. 
3) Vulnerabilities of earthland systems 
Numerous services ashore are based on the permanent 
provision of AIS data received by shore stations. These 
services may be navigation assistance systems, maritime 
assistance systems or traffic organization systems that are 
provided by coastal states or private bodies such as harbours 
(including traffic surveillance, provision of AtoN and 
maritime safety information, provision of differential 
positioning information). Other services such as fleet tracking, 
logistics also rely on AIS data in order to work properly. 
Neither control nor mandatory regulations are imposed on 
the installers of such shore systems (AIS base stations, 
receivers, AtoN transponders). The responsibility of the 
correct installation, connection and configuration of these 
devices rely solely on the technical units in charge of these 
operations. There is nowadays no means provided under 
recommendation of the IMO or of the international 
organizations in charge of the standardization that enables a 
posteriori checking of the good operational and technical 
behaviour of these AIS services. 
It is therefore possible to envision that AtoN information 
provided by AIS means or other information provided by the 
network of base stations may be erroneous (false positioning 
of AtoNs, changes in the nominal emission rate of AIS 
messages, erroneous differential positioning information). 
4) Vulnerabilities at radiocommunication level 
The AIS technology is based on VHF frequency used also 
in current VHF voice communications. Though the channels 
used for AIS are not a standard accessible communication 
channel for VHF voice devices onboard and onshore, shore 
and embedded VHF radios can have access to the same 
channels (but their configuration specifically regarding the 
numbering of the maritime radio channels differ due to the 
bandwidth of the different channels and their capacity to hold 
full duplex, half duplex or single channel communications). 
The use of radios allowing to have access to the AIS channels 
through manual tuning may cause radio interferences on these 
frequencies. Such an emitter tuned on AIS frequencies may 
impair the capacity of neighbouring receivers to receive 
distant AIS messages and it may also impair the capacity of a 
close transmitter of broadcasting its messages by masking it to 
all distant receivers. 
A similar problem could also occur on-board or in coastal 
radio stations because of the proximity of numerous 
radiocommunication devices dedicated to AIS, VHF voice 
communications or VHF digital communications such as 
Digital Selective Call (DSC). Though not tuned on AIS 
frequencies, the closeness and difference in power of adjacent 
VHF devices may cause interferences and mask received 
messages as well as broadcasted messages from the AIS 
transponder or base station. This interchannel interference 
could either totally block emitted or received messages or it 
may be a less sensitive but still active phenomenon by limiting 
the range of received or emitted messages. 
Other means to attack the AIS system in itself consist in 
targeting the channels used to exchange messages. If this is 
not done by radio interference, this can be done by 
overloading these channels with meaningless messages. This 
could cause all ships to drastically lower the range of received 
messages (a technical security measure automatically 
implemented on AIS transponders). This may also have side 
consequences and block the access to AIS slots for all AIS 
devices working in CSTDMA mode (carrier sense time 
division multiple access is a mode only used by class B ships 
and AtoNs that will cause them to emit in a given slot of time 
provided no one is already emitting at the same time).  
Wrong messages or radio interferences are also susceptible 
to block the good sending and reception of valid AIS 
messages. More efficient ways do exist that can be put into 
action at radiocommunication level in order to disturb AIS 
communications. 
The easiest way to input wrong information in ships and 
shore systems is to simply emit an AIS message that conforms 
to all standards and formats but that contains erroneous 
information (wrong identification, positioning, dynamic and 
voyage related information, wrong assignments, etc.). The 
consequences and the main attacks are described in detail 
below in part B. These attacks are probably among the riskiest 
ones since they are easy to do, difficult to detect and may be 
focused on maximum and direct nuisance to the safety and 
security of targeted ships or to all ships in a given region. 
B. Potential threats to security and safety of navigation 
Beyond irregular behaviors at sea, malfeasance 
mechanisms and bad navigation practices have inevitably 
emerged recently to circumvent, alter or exploit such 
surveillance systems in the interests of offenders.  
By exploiting the vulnerabilities presented earlier, some of 
which are easier to put in place than others for an identical 
threat, an attacker may generate numerous issues. The threats 
may either affect individual ships or put multiple ships 
simultaneously in hazardous situations. These actions could 
impact the ships themselves, the people onboard and the cargo 
by lessening their security level or by exposing them to 
immediate dangers. Some threats could have an incidence on 
the surveillance capacity of VTS centres and harbours, but they 
could also affect the assignment, positioning and use of 
maritime or terrestrial search and rescue resources or the use of 
other resources dedicated to the security of the territory, the 
customs or to military operations. 
Not only the consequences of the implementation of such 
threats might strike the primary stakeholders targeted but the 
consequences, thus the risks, could be far much worse and 
affect much wider fields such as the environment at large scale, 
whole regions and their people, the global trading and 
economy. 
 
Fig 1. Threats and risks at different levels 
Recent experiments have demonstrated some of the 
vulnerabilities of the AIS [1]. In this work, Balduzzi et al. 
propose an overview of AIS threats and classify them as 
software and radio attacks. He identifies: ship spoofing, AtoN 
spoofing, collision spoofing, AIS-SART spoofing, weather 
forecasting, AIS hijacking and availability disruption threats. 
Actually the attacks and malfeasance should be considered as 
possible at each step of the system (Figure 1).  
For instance, it is easy to spoof a ship identity by issuing 
the IMO or MMSI (Maritime Mobile Service Identity) number 
from another ship. Some fishing boats are practicing this 
offense in order to fish illegally for example by pretending to 
be a yacht. It is difficult to detect their illegal fishing at 
distance. Some captains also switch off their AIS to disappear 
from monitoring centres screens and electronic chart display 
and information systems (ECDIS) of neighbouring ships. 
These acts are committed consciously by people on board 
(Fig. 1, location 2). 
Furthermore, ships can be hijacked without the knowledge 
of their crew or surveillance centres by injecting false 
differential GPS information. It is possible to affect on-board 
GPS position in order to divert it from its original way (Fig. 1, 
location 1). In that case, the captain thinks he follows a wrong 
cape and manoeuvres the vessel in order to bring it back to the 
right cape. But the captain actually diverts his own vessel 
unbeknownst to him. What would be, in that case, the faced 
risks? The vessel can be guided towards a dangerous 
navigation area, such as a reef zone. The vessel could then run 
aground. If we imagine the case of a super tanker, its 
grounding would be followed by an oil slick, and a disaster for 
the environment. The vessel could be guided towards an area 
of dense traffic, such as a TSS, increasing the risk of boarding 
with another vessel. A cape towards an area where containers 
are drifting (e.g. in February 2013, a storm caused the loss of 
500 containers in the North Sea) would make a collision with 
a container and damages to the vessel unavoidable.  
AIS devices and navigational aids (AtoN) can also be 
reconfigured at distance (Fig. 1, location 4). The generation of 
virtual (and false) AtoN or the hacking of their remote 
maintenance parameters can have dramatic consequences on 
navigation. One can imagine risks raised for instance by the 
extinction of a lighthouse at distance during the night.  
Other experiments have also demonstrated that it is also 
possible to generate false alerts at sea, forcing organizations in 
charge of maritime rescue such as MRCCs to take charge of 
these alerts and to bring help to the virtual vessel from which 
the false distress signal comes from (Fig. 2, location 3). This 
rallying of means uselessly endangers rescuing crews and the 
mobilized resources cannot be used for a real accident. 
 
Fig 2. Five false positions (red arrows) in Brest bay injected in MarineTraffic. 
At the beginning AIS was mainly used through VHF in order 
to provide a local situation to ships at sea. With the wide 
diffusion of AIS technology to all classes of vessels and the 
ability to access to the Internet in the vicinity of the coast, more 
and more people, at sea or ashore, use an Internet online AIS 
provider such as Marine Traffic (marinetraffic.com), AIS Hub 
(aishub.net), Vessel Finder (vesselfinder.com). These providers 
could be sensible to many Internet threats like denial-of-service 
(DoS), virus attack or SQL Injection (Fig. 1, location 5). As 
these providers (even state ones) are mostly broadcasting 
positioning information without an accurate analysis of 
received messages they might broadcast false position reports 
(Fig. 1, location 3) to their end-users as illustrated by Figure 2.  
As a summary, the AIS's system, its implementation and the 
protocol specification as well as the whole chain of data 
transmission can be affected by many threats, offering multiple 
attack possibilities. We propose to use long term analysis of 
messages and ships’ trajectories with the identification of 
specific behaviors in order to identify abnormalities in AIS 
messages. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND ARTCHITECTURE 
This section introduces the proposed methodological 
approach for modelling, analyzing and detecting maritime 
threats possibly caused by the AIS.  
A. Modelling risks 
In order to recognize and detect the risks it is necessary to 
first model risk scenario. Knowledge on risks is dragged from 
interviews of maritime domain experts and reviews of the 
literature.  
Risks will be modeled with ontologies. An ontology can be 
defined as being “a formal and explicit specification of a 
shared conceptualization.” [5, 17]. This definition highlights 
four particularly important notions in the ontology area: 
• Formal: means that the conceptualization and the 
representation of the domain must be standardized and 
used by a  computer hardware; 
• Description: specifies that both concepts and constraints 
used are defined in a declarative way ; 
• Conceptualization: underlines the fact that an ontology is 
only an abstraction of the real world and that the terms 
used and the relationships between them shall be 
described without ambiguity ; 
• Community: implies that ontologies promote a consensual 
knowledge for a community of agents. 
In order to understand the behavior of a vessel and to 
check that information it delivers is reliable, its sole location is 
not sufficient. Indeed, this behavior can be analyzed through a 
great amount of pieces of information (meteorological 
conditions, surrounding vessels, etc….) which must be taken 
into account. It is here that lies the concept of semantic 
behavior. At each location is attached a number of pieces of 
information that are judged relevant enough, and which will 
then be used during the risky behavior detection process. The 
creation of a semantic representation of trajectories, and 
consequently a representation of behaviors, requires the 
enhancement of the locations of vessels by several contextual 
pieces of information [6]. In order to do that, three main 
ontologies were created, basing on the model previously 
developed by Yan [7, 8]: 
• A trajectory ontology including various spatiotemporal 
concepts, necessary for a geometric definition of 
trajectories.  
• A geographic ontology including the concepts specific to 
territory description (roads, harbors, bays, etc….).  
• A domain ontology which is, as its name stands for, 
relative to the studied domain.  
Our analysis of risks will be based on a four-step method, 
shared by several possible risks [4]: 
• 1st step: technical and functional analysis of the system. 
Its goal is to understand the studied system through its 
components and the search of the understanding of its 
purposes. It is a model of the studied system ; 
• 2nd step: the qualitative analysis. Beyond the simple 
identification of threats (search and identification of threat 
sources), its purpose is the study of threats processes, i.e. 
the research of feared events or of breakdowns, as well as 
the reasons for the threat sources to trigger themselves 
and the potential consequences of feared events ; 
• 3rd step: the quantitative analysis. It enables us to 
measure, to weight, in terms of occurrence probability 
and seriousness of consequences, the feared events or the 
system breakdowns previously analyzed. The eventual 
purpose of this step is the organization into a hierarchy of 
feared events or of system breakdowns ; 
• 4th step: the synthesis. It enables the highlighting of 
breakdowns and their combination use. The objective is to 
ascertain the most critical components and thus to 
propose the technical improvements likely to master 
them. 
B. Towards real-time detection 
Monitoring of coastal maritime areas for various purposes 
like safety and security, traffic management or protection of 
strategic areas, has been largely based on the identification of 
positions and trajectories and abnormal behavior detection 
[10]. This kind of detection is based on (1) the long-term and 
large-scale integration of positions from maritime traffic 
continuously and, (2) spatio-temporal analysis able to 
determine and classify a given maritime situation. This analysis 
requires the identification and classification of navigational 
behaviors, techniques of falsification of position reporting 
systems and knowledge extraction methods to detect abnormal 
maritime situations. 
This detection can rely on a rule-based engine approach 
allowing to formalise rules and to ensure the link between the 
conceptual specification of a situation and its implementation 
[6, 12, 13]. Several studies addressed spatial ontologies to 
describe maritime traffic and identify dangerous and/or 
suspicious behaviors [14, 6]. Related to these behaviors, 
researchers have proposed solutions for anomaly detection 
from supervised approaches. They used sets of recorded 
trajectories and situations to define a panel of typical 
abnormal behaviors from statistical analysis [10, 15, 16].  
Nevertheless, situation awareness in these works is mainly 
concerned with navigation mobilities. An information system 
designed for detection of AIS spoofing should provide a wider 
spectrum of analysis. The proposed approach relies on a 
simple postulate: an attack or a falsification of the AIS has 
consequences on received messages. 
An AIS device can broadcast up to 27 different messages in 
a range of approximately 35 nautical miles. Data exchanged 
include in particular static information (vessel name, 
dimensions, etc.) and dynamic information (heading, speed, 
GPS position, etc.). Positioning information is transmitted at 
high frequency (2-12 seconds for a moving ship, 3 min for an 
anchored vessel). The system transmits on less regular basis 
meta-information related to the ship (international identifier, 
name, size) and its route (destination, date and time of arrival). 
Additionally the system broadcasts some control messages 
(e.g. management of channels and transceiver modes by a base 
station is done by a message 22) and aids to navigation 
messages.  
In order to detect when an AIS device is falsified or is 
undergoing an attack through a message-based analysis, real-
time AIS information should be analysed online and compared 
to historical, expected or predicted information [11]. This 
approach entails a challenging combination of the cartographic 
and risk context, position reports from ships and behavioral 
analysis and context-based analysis of AIS messages. The 
processing architecture currently designed relies on a hybrid 
spatio-temporal database system combining online and offline 
processing (on-going work). Messages are processed on the 
fly, specific message patterns or spatio-temporal behaviors are 
mined according to the maritime context. At the same time, 
messages are stored in the historical database where data are 
aggregated and summarized in order to feed on-line processing 
and analysis with a historical maritime context.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces issues emerging from falsification of 
AIS messages. Risks and threats have been exposed and a 
methodological approach for modelling, analyzing and 
detecting these new maritime risks is presented. The objective 
of this research is to detect when a ship’s AIS system or a 
maritime surveillance system is undergoing an attack through 
real-time message-based analysis and data mining.  
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